The 'region' and 'regional change' have been elusive ideas within political and economic geography, and in essence require a greater understanding of their dynamic characteristics. Trailing in the backwaters of the devolution to the Celtic nations of Britain, the contemporary era of New Labour's politicaleconomic ideology, manifest through 'third-way' governance in England places the region and its functional capacity into the heart of geographical inquiry. Drawing upon a new regionalist epistemology, this paper seeks to recover a sense of (regional) political economy through a critical investigation of the development and formulation of Blair's "New Regional Policy" (NRP). I address how New Labour has attempted to marry economic regionalisation on the one hand, and democratic regionalism on the other. This paper specifically questions the wisdom of such a marriage of politically distinct ideologies through a critical investigation of the underlying contradictions of their strategy from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint. Demonstrated both in the North East no vote in 2004, and in the post-mortem undertaken by the ODPM Select Committee in 2005, the paper illustrates how a loss of political drive gradually undermined the capacity of devolution to deliver in England. Finally, I argue that through the lens of the NRP we can speculate on some of the wider issues and implications for the study of regional governance.
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THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF BLAIR'S "NEW REGIONAL POLICY"
"Offer[ing] a sympathetic review of certain institutionalist perspectives currently at the vanguard of economic geographical discourse and urbanregional inquiry… the approaches are beset by several conceptual deficiencies and sources of potential confusion. These include… a thin political economy most conspicuous in the failure to appreciate fully the critical role of the state in shaping the urban -regional fabric and a related weakness in examining the asymmetries of power which enframe the governance of space economies." MacLeod (2001a: 1146, emphasis added)
Introduction: from New Regionalism to New Regional Political Economy
Shortly after New Labour's landslide sweep to power in 1997, a comprehensive programme of constitutional modernisation was set in motion throughout Great Britain, which resulted in the creation of an elected Parliament for Scotland, a National Assembly for Wales, an Assembly for Northern Ireland, an elected London Mayor to lead a newly formed Greater
London Assembly, and a working partnership of Regional Development Agencies and Regional Chambers in each of the eight English regions. For Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and London, the restructuring of their state institutions to install the new mechanisms of governance that would enable them to engage fully in devolved politics was relatively straightforward.
However, in England:
"Striking images of people celebrating the birth of their new democratic institutions in Cardiff and Edinburgh reaffirmed the view that the way in which we 'do' politics in the UK was changed forever… [However] the English have had little chance to celebrate. The governance of England represents a gaping hole at the centre of the Government's devolution programme." Tomaney and Mitchell (1999: 2) By the end of Labour's first term (2001) with what the government described at the opportunity to set in motion their proposals to create an ERA for the region which "will allow the region to truly take control of its own destiny and enable it to move up the economic and social prosperity ladder". Where the existing arrangements of RDAs and
Regional Chambers had their roots firmly entrenched within the contradictions exposed in past waves of regional policy, the referendum on whether to create an ERA for the North East region provided the opportunity for two new breaks from traditional regional policy discourse: (i) top-down economic regionalisation no longer had to run parallel and distanciated from bottom-up democratic regionalism; and (ii) all regions did not have to be treat alike, but individual regions could make an individual choice -through a referendum.
On 4 th November 2004, however, traditional regionalised policy in
England was reinforced when the North East electorate -to whom an ERA was designed to offer "a distinct political voice and a real say over decisions which matter to them" (Prescott, quoted in DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002: foreword) -voted emphatically against the proposals (78% against) to enable the "twin-tracks" (Jeffery and Mawson, 2002) of economic regionalisation and democratic regionalism to be aligned more strategically. This statement of discontent with the government proposals by the North East electorate Citation: HARRISON, J., 2006. The political-economy of Blair's "New Regional Policy." Geoforum, 37 (6), marked a dramatic end to the 'new' in Blair's NRP, and once more highlighted a series of important political-economic tensions in the way that academics understand the geography of regions, and how policymakers interpret this in the formulation of regional policy. Labour's determination (in principle) to devolve political and institutional capacities through a progressive programme of constitutional reform coalesced around (i) a desire to remedy a party political legacy of past failures to implement devolution; (ii) to align Britain more closely with its continental European neighbours; and, (iii) to seek greater engagement with a populist belief that had been spreading throughout Western Europe and North America in the mid-1990s known as the 'new regionalism'. The latter of these three themes raises critical questions about the emergence of the NRP, and it is this, which I want to develop here.
Aligning itself most prominently with a neo-Marxian institutionalised political-economic approach (Amin, 2001; Jessop, 2001) , the new regionalism broadly claims that contemporary capitalism and its territorial configuration are best regulated and governed in and through the decentralisation of socioeconomic decision-making and associated policy implementation to subnational institutional frameworks and supports. The dominant strand constituting the new regionalism coalesces under the banner of economic geography, and argues that the region is establishing itself as the scale where knowledge creation, learning, enterprise, and innovation which are believed to be critical to economic development in the contemporary era of capitalism are coalescing (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Florida, 1995; Storper, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998) . This strand of the new regionalism elicits the claim that there is an economic dividend to be gained from harnessing and developing new structures of economic governance at the regional level.
The alternative approach is based in political science and advocates the adoption of a 'progressive' new regionalism (Keating, 1997; 1998) . This can be seen through three interrelated processes which appear to be challenging the authority of the nation state and constitute the arguments of progressive new regionalism: (i) there is a loss of power upwards through the processes of Europeanisation; (ii) there is a loss of power downwards through the growth of regional territorial identity, politics of assertion, and policies of devolution; and, (iii) there is a loss of power outwards through globalisation Citation: HARRISON, J., 2006. The political-economy of Blair's "New Regional Policy." Geoforum, 37 (6), and market forces. Theories of devolution, therefore, tend to range from those which stress its economic value (which are predominantly new regionalist approaches) against those political science theories of multi-level governance which stress the intrinsic value of regional governance as good governance by providing decision-making as close to the governed as possible given the policy domain context.
Jointly under the banner of the 'new regionalism' (Amin, 1999) and 'regional political economy' (Agnew, 2000; MacLeod, 2000) they have given rise to a plethora of accounts of the economic resurgence of regions within an increasingly globalised arena. In short, consensus states that theoretically regions can dualistically induce both a democratic dividend as well as the aforementioned economic dividend, and that the regional scale offers "both a convincing theoretical explanation of recent and future regional economic development and also the best approach to policy formation" (Lovering, 1999: 380; see also, Regionalist ideologies and movements have agreed on the necessity for decentralising power from a time-honoured and antiquated London centric model in principle throughout the duration of the twentieth century (Tomaney, 2000; Amin et al., 2003; Lyons, 2004) . Neville Johnson (1983: 6) surmises how a relatively stable set of propositions has characterised the general principles of decentralisation: (i) the concentration of power at the centre in the British system of government is harmful and should be reversed; (ii) the practices of government are insufficiently democratic, in particular the extent of citizen participation; and, (iii) the rate of economic development has been inadequate and unequally distributed. Taking this forward, this section traces the origins of regional policy in England and argues that we have seen the Citation: HARRISON, J., 2006. The political-economy of Blair's "New Regional Policy." Geoforum, 37 (6), pp. 932-943
emergence of a twin-track approach (Jeffery and Mawson, 2002) with important links to previous rounds of political intervention.
Before 1916, the London Westminster Parliaments was involved in evolving from being a colonial centre to a national parliament. At the forefront of this transition was the seriously discussed 'Home Rule for All'; namely that the colonies, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, be given home rule, and
Westminster would become a federal parliament; within which, England would then have to be regionalised to avoid it dominating the federation. That a federal approach was never adopted is interesting because it reinforces the colonial relationship between London and the regions.
Following on from this, the period 1916-1944 was characterised by the problematisation of the English regions. As such, World War I marked the establishment of the first regional structures in England, when a number of regional offices for Government departments were created in order to regulate food supplies and labour distribution. Coinciding with these practical necessities and the calls for Home Rule in Ireland, two initial devolution schemes were proposed which both treat England as a single entity rather than as a sub-national jigsaw of regional pieces (Mawson, 1997) .
The inter-war years saw hostility to the overwhelming role played out by the city of London in British society, and famously led Sir Patrick Geddes to commission C.B. Fawcett to elaborate on an earlier piece he had written (Fawcett, 1917) , which supported his call that the politics of the day was inescapably premised on tensions between "centralised government -and civic regionalism" (1919 ( , quoted in Defries, 1927 . This statement has subsequently become ingrained into the evolution of the Labour Party throughout the duration of the twentieth century and, furthermore, it lies at the heart of Blair's NRP. Centralisers in the Labour Party have historically implored top-down Fabian socialism as was the case in the 1950s where services, most notably associated with the National Health Service, were provided by the centre. Adopting the language of Cooke and Morgan (1998) , this first wave of regionalism can be conceptualised as the state-centred repertoire, characterised by the use of 'functional regions' and the theory of 'spatial Keynesianism' (Martin and Sunley, 1997) . Regional policies were simple variants of a broader set of political initiatives that derived from the Citation: HARRISON, J., 2006. The political-economy of Blair's "New Regional Policy." Geoforum, 37 (6), pp. 932-943
interventionist Keynesian state that drew its political support from the disprorportionally high levels of unemployment that had scarred the country in the inter-war years.
In creating eight Regional Economic Planning Boards (REPBs) under the 1960's Wilson government, paradoxically these represented 'top-down' approaches to the mobilisation of regional economies in their guise as centrally controlled institutions. Based upon French-style 'indicative' planning, they were wholly reliant on central government, were devoid of executive powers and were administered by civil servants working out of the centre.
REPBs are important because they provide an illustration of how the political legitimacy and powers awarded to subnational institutions are fought over in processes of decentralisation. Devolution revolves centrally around the dualistic notion that all other things being equal, national government will strive to devolve administrative responsibility to the subnational tier whilst limiting to a minimum the resources attached (Rodríguéz-Pose and Gill, 2003) . This historical example of the REPBs highlighted how despite the name, they were kept national by a dominant centralist government, and moreover, the Department of Economic Affairs singularly failed to offer any resources to implement the REPBs proposals (Smith, 1965) .
The emergence of the NRP can be traced through the ideological beliefs held by the leading proponents of the Alternative Regional Strategy (ARS) (Parliamentary Spokesman's Working Group, 1982) who stood in the 'localiser' camp. They held the belief that previous plans were unsustainable, and sought to look at why these distortions happen. Written during the first term of Thatcherism, and thus stood in opposition to the prevailing trends in political-economic policy, the group claimed that socioeconomic distortions resulted from the complete absence of any regional strategy, or economic devolution to England (Miller and Mawson, 1986) . Despite political claims that any attempt to afford development agencies to England would be deemed "a rather amateurish approach to a very sophisticated game" (Hansard, 1976) the then Shadow Regional Affairs Spokesman, John Prescott, remained convinced of their capabilities. Drawing heavily on his own historical and personal accounts of the failed planning boards of the 1960s, Prescott's team was purposive in wanting to establish an administrative socioeconomic (Cooke and Morgan, 1998) . What is critical for the basis of this paper is establishing that regional policy cannot be detached from the broader political-economic ideology in which it is positioned. Thus, by 1997, English devolution had become firmly entrenched as a question of economic governance rather than democratic realisation (see Tomaney, 2005; Jones et al. 2005) . What this section has so far highlighted is that New Labour's programme of devolution and constitutional change must be viewed within the wider context of beliefs surrounding the structuring of governance. Although the state retains its unique institutional status responsible for social cohesion and the integrity of the national system of innovation, the associational repertoire requires two institutional innovations: (i) the devolution of power within the state system to better placed subnational tiers; and, (ii) the delegation of certain tasks to business-led associations with greater knowledge and credibility that a state agency (Cooke and Morgan, 1998) . It is against this broader politicaleconomic backdrop characteristically known as the 'third-way' that New
Labour's policies of decentralisation must be framed. The paper now considers the territorial form of their political strategy.
New Labour, New Regionalists
Whilst in political opposition to the Conservative administration, ambitious proposals were put forward to embark upon a programme of wide reaching constitutional reform "reversing the tide of centralisation and giving regions and the people who live in them more power to determine their own future" (Prescott, 1996 , quoted in John et al., 2002 . These proposals were designed not only to incubate economic development, but also to appease the strong regionalist lobby in the northern regions through simultaneously adopting an approach to decentralisation, bringing policies closer to the people and rebuilding accountability through two independent 'tracks' that have run side-by-side (see Jeffery and Mawson, 2002) .
Road 1 -Straw's Regional Democracy: Jack Straw (then Shadow Home
Secretary) believed a dualistic approach to developing a structural presence at the regional level could provide the solution to Blair's problem of how English regionalism could sit neatly alongside the broader commitments towards Celtic devolution: (i) the formation of Regional Chambers was presented as the means of formalising the plethora of pre-existing groupings already operating within the regions; and, (ii) the second step would lead, in the future, to the establishment of directly elected regional assemblies in those regions where public demand is evident (Labour Party, 1995) .
Subsequently, A New Voice for England's Regions (Labour Party, 1996) reiterated their commitment by expanding its horizons to outline some of the linkages and hurdles that lay between the two proposed phases ii . At the crux of Straw's proposals, however, lay the Conservative claim that regional government would actually create more bureaucracy (Curry, 1995; see also, Straw, 1995; Whitehead, 1996 , 1996) proposed that every region should have 'one-stop' RDAs promoting economic development within an accountable framework.
In the process of ridding the angst of Thatcherite conservatism from the political map, Blair's New Labour set about realigning the government machine towards its proposed institutional framework for the English regions (Russell and Hazell, 2000) . Shortly after coming to power, it was seen that (1999: 390) that the new regionalism is a "policy tail wagging the analytical dog". Jones goes onto square the circle on this argument when he makes the critical acknowledgement that if this political mantra is central to the NRP then it is 'doubly misleading' because it then assumes that structures of regional governance can in theory intervene in the economy, smooth over its contradictions, and ensure economic growth. However, it would be unfair to level this at the feet of the RDAs who have been largely defenceless to any macro-economic restructuring that has occurred within the English regions (Tomaney and Hetherington, 2000 ; see also Amin, 2001; Lovering, 1999) .
With the overriding belief that the RDAs would be seen as part of a wider programme aimed at redressing the structural weakness of the UK economy, the policymakers have taken for granted the importance of higherlevel state intervention at the national level. Furthermore, the erosion of national fiscal support has left regions open to intensified inter-spatial competition and a necessity to engage in trial-and-error experiments, which Jessop (2002: 159) argues "promotes uneven development rather than compensates for it". Critically, if these aforementioned theoretical concerns are in fact realities, then we must view the NRP as being constructed upon rather shaky foundations.
Muddles, Shortfalls, and Discrepancies: a perceived reality
In order to gauge whether New Labour's politically motivated economic regionalisation of government policy has changed the ability of actors to harness an economic dividend in the English regions, it is necessary to explore three key tensions that have emerged with the deployment of RDAs.
Firstly, the NRPs privileging of economic regionalisation over democratic regionalism has meant that despite some tinkering at the edges, RDAs have retained their unilateral economic focus:
"What we are doing in this exercise is addressing the economic deficit…There are structural weaknesses within the competitive wealthcreating base of the English regions that have to be addressed -on that there is, I think, absolute unanimity. Wealth creation is the bottom line." Richard Caborn, quoted in Financial Times (1998: 2) This tension was more than simply the outcome a bureaucratic 'muddle', the conflated appearance of the RDAs was the direct result of a clear dichotomy of beliefs running through the Labour hierarchy. The majority view of 'regional sceptics' headed by the axis of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown hailed the RDAs as simply an important innovation in their overall politicaleconomic strategy. As Rentoul (1996: 467) reveals, there was no foresight (so-to-speak) of a greater regional agenda lying in wait: "in England, [Blair] does not expect devolution to go beyond regional development agencies". Secondly, England's particular take on the new regionalism has a philosophical implication that all regions can be winners (Caborn, 1996) through the advancement of regional structures of governance, but this appears on the surface to do little to address the unique problems occurring in individually unique regions . Retorting claims that there is an economic divide existing within England (Cabinet Office, 1999a), the evidence suggests that Blair's policies have done little to support his advocacy that interregional divisions don't exist. With the belief that regional economic failure was "turning Britain into a nation of regional have's and regional have not's" (Caborn, 1996; DTI, 2000) , RDAs were exalted as the primary mechanism for addressing these concerns. The suggestion is that far from levelling the playing field for the English regions, the failure to incorporate macroeconomic issues has only served to accentuate the regional economic chasm v . Whereas previous rounds of regional policy in England have been designed to regulate capital movements and redistribute resources through state policy interventionism (see Parsons, 1988) , the RDAs have provided evidence of a reversal in this approach. "Business thought it was promised a lion but the initial reality was closer to a mouse." John Cridland, quoted in Tomaney et al. (2001) However, having survived a close and critical examination of their capacities, the RDAs have showed that they can play an important role as economic catalysts within the English regions. Moreover, they need to encourage partners in their quest to create transitional learning regions for the 21 st Century and must be prepared to commit to becoming genuine learning RDAs, prepared to experiment, to debate their corner, and not afraid to take risks (Shutt, 2000) . In this scenario, rather than proclaiming the RDAs being in the vanguard as "economic powerhouses for sustainable growth" (DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002: 5) for the regions, they would be more aptly suited to acting as regional 'instigators'/'incubators' of indigenous growth clusters. The RDA model is ostensibly built to deal with small-scale projects, but it has found itself working on projects over and above their station.
Furthermore, it has been undeniable that their deployment has led to deeprooted concerns regarding the supplementing of the already heavily burdened democratic deficit in the English regions.
Decentralisation, Democratisation and Rationalisation
"What we need are policies which empower communities so they can determine their own future…A new regional policy which offers flexibility and local ownership, and which actively promotes partnership working and 'joined-up' policies, must be a priority for Labour." Richard Caborn (2000) With the limited accountability of RDAs, the Labour government moved swiftly in its attempts to inject a degree of associational democracy in the to operate in a region, but that they also needed to be of that region (Morgan, 1999) . As non-departmental public bodies, the RDAs themselves are accountable upwards to Whitehall, but fail to adequately "meet the exacting standard of being fully accountable downwards to their regions" (ibid., 665).
RDAs exhibit the problems of progressive new regionalism being an 'uneasy halfway house' caught in the middle between these vertical tracks of accountability (Harding et al., 1999) .
The initial skirmishes with issues surrounding democracy have ostensibly taken a back-seat role to the economic concerns in the NRP, which is wholly consistent with historical regional policy (see section 2). From discussions thus far, I believe that the government has become embroiled in a multiscalar economic and democratic conundrum whereby the mixing of academic ideology and policy initiatives, juxtaposed alongside the institutional restructuring inherent with the modernisation of government, is increasingly leaving the NRP distanciated from new regionalist orthodoxy. On the one hand, this growing chasm between the rhetoric outlined in the new regionalism and the reality of the measures being deployed on the ground is ostensibly the result of the state. On the other hand, and contrary to advancing the notions of civic engagement and strategic partnership working for the purposes of instilling trust across regional partners, there is a huge asymmetry of in power because the NRP has found itself implementing these democratic ideals solely to enable the state to justify their policy of economic regionalisation.
Towards a Solution: Towards a Regional Renaissance?
Through "In many respects the two go hand in hand: the Government believes that greater accountability will itself lead to a more effective decisionmaking process. In turn, giving an elected assembly the strategic lead on regional issues will help to improve regional performance." DTLR/Cabinet Office (2002: Para. 3.4) To achieve this dream, Prescott was only too aware though that he needed to convince the sceptical regionalists Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and
Stephen Byers, to commit to his proposals by relinquishing some of their centrally-based powers and resources in order to put some flesh on the proposals. In order to achieve this the NRP had to remodel itself to fit in with higher-level policy strands such as government modernisation (Cabinet "We are moving away from the old Britain of subjects where people had to look upwards to a Whitehall bureaucracy for their solutions -to a Britain of citizens where region to region, locality to locality we are ourselves in charge and where it is up to us." Chancellor of the Exchequer -Gordon Brown (2001) "The economic differences between UK regions are clear and indicate that a winners' circle is emerging, with some regions keeping up and staying in touch while other slip behind. These are the underlying causes we need to tackle through a strong, radically reformed regional policy, simply tinkering at the edges will not be enough."
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry -Stephen Byers (DTI, 2000)
Interestingly, this shifting of previously sceptical regionalists in the upper echelons of the Labour government (such as Gordon Brown and
Stephen Byers) towards developing policies with a regional emphasis to them did bring some interesting debates to the surface regarding the role of the state (see Morgan, 2001 ) but many commentators believed that for the NRP to proceed as planned that this was simply a measure of its success to date.
Early in Labour's second term (which extended between [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] and with the NRPs momentum gathering pace a window of opportunity was presented to the three northern regions of England vii to push forward with referendum to decide whether the people wanted an Elected Regional Assembly (ERA). The ERA proposals marked a landmark opportunity which broke with the historical tradition of regional policy and provided the 'new' in Blair's NRP. Where the RDA/Regional Chamber project retained strong links with previous waves of regional policy in England, the ERA referendums were designed provided two important differences to those key tensions identified within the RDA project (see Section 3.1)(i) economic regionalisation no longer had to run parallel and distanciated from democratic regionalism, but could be merged together to make a coherent regional policy; and, (ii) all regions did not have to be treat alike, but individual regions could make an individual choice. This significant shift in the narrative of the NRP appears of the surface to address important weaknesses that had existed in regional policy for generations. However, on the third key tension identified earlier in the paperthe chasm between policy rhetoric and political reality -remained as wide and as problematic as ever within regional policy. On 4 th November 2004 this was born out when the electorate of the North East voted emphatically against the proposals and in effect marked an end to the 'new' in Blair's NRP. In explaining their defeat, the leader of the Yes4theNorthEast campaign has focused on this chasm within the proposals:
"I think the weakness of the offer probably played a part but I think there are other issues. The proposal to create a regional assembly was quite a complex idea and we failed to demonstrate how it would benefit people as individuals. It was a difficult task made more difficult by the limited powers which people perceived to be on offer. We were promising them jam tomorrow as the powers weren't strong but we hoped they would grow in time." Professor John Tomaney (quoted in Kearney and Jenkins, 2004) In the final section of the paper I want to expand this further by arguing that while the ERA proposals managed to negotiate two of the contradictions of RDAs (and regional policy historically), the underlying rationale for its rejection by the electorate was the states failure to eradicate the asymmetrical nature of the powers that were to be devolved to the new institutions, because while some powers were pushed towards the region other powers were being drawn back into the centre. Byers) as a measure of the NRPs success, the underlying reality was that it was paradoxically bringing the whole process to its knees.
While the ERA proposals managed to negotiate two of the contradictions that have blighted the RDAs (and regional policy historically), the increasing role of the central state institutions in the development of the NRP gave them a bulging and overburdening portfolio of policy responsibilities without any appropriate powers and resources to make them equitable. Furthermore, the increasing centralist tendencies of the statewhich are directly opposite to the principles of devolution -continued to add to this complexity because the more responsibility that was forced upon the In essence, the scale of voter apathy in the North East referenda (see Section 1) reflected an electorate who appreciated and identified with the proposals for devolution, but who became entirely disillusioned with the complex reality that they were presented with. As I have shown throughout this paper, there is an historical thread of contradictions that have run through and failed to be adequately addressed historically by different waves of English regional policy. In the final part of this paper I want to move the debate forward by taking three interesting and uniquely different approaches that are being debated currently, and asking whether they can address these contradictions.
For A New Regional Policy?
After the North East regional referenda, the ODPM Housing, Local Government and the Regions Committee (2005: 3) reported that any future legislation would need to be 'more ambitious' than those presented in order to 'create regional bodies that are fit for purpose'. Moreover, the Committee (ibid.) stated that:
"The scope of the powers and responsibilities which the Government was prepared to give to Assemblies was disappointing and would limit their effectiveness. The general power proposed for elected assemblies needed to be more explicit with more specific statements of their functions. This would provide greater clarity, and could also fire the imagination of the general public and potential assembly candidates."
Finally, this Committee believed that "in many key areas where power is devolved, central government would have remained the dominant party in the relationship with elected regional assemblies" (p20). As this paper has noted earlier, this contradiction is critical to our understanding of contemporary regionalised policy because while the centre devolves power and responsibility with one hand, the other (centralist) hand of government is taking powers away from the regions and dragging them back to the centre. It is in this contradiction that has led Musson et al (2005) to forward a similar reading of events in regard to the existing regional agencies, arguing that most analysts writing about the processes of decentralisation have over- diluted form of devolution to that mentioned above because it also has a shortfall in regional democracy, and is simply a rescaling rather than a resolving of political and economic deficits.
Rather than drawing down powers from London in the form of devolution -which it is argued has done little to alter the 'spatial geometry' of England -Amin et al. (2003) have forwarded a radical proposal which disperses state and public institutions in equal shares throughout the nation.
Whilst this proposal is currently constrained to an imagined reality, in the context of this paper, it's theoretical foundation is very thought-provoking because it seeks to remedy the asymmetrical nature of power and responsibility which has so bedevilled contemporary institutional arrangements for devolution. Moreover, the central tenet of their argument has in fact been developed further through the governments Lyons Review (2004) which sketched out proposals for the potential of public sector relocation throughout Britain. Amin et al. (2003) believe that this type of dispersal in state and public institutions, equally throughout the regions, will offer a radically new way of imagining the spatiality of the nation with the promise of a multi-nodal rather than hierarchical nation, and a method for alleviating both regional economic and political inequality. However, the major weakness/contradiction that emerges in both the theoretical (Amin et al., 2003) and the practical (Lyons, 2004 ) models is that these proposals are not very original. For sure, these proposals merely mark a transition from traditional regionalised policies based on the dispersal of finance, to the dispersal of people across territory.
While all three proposals mentioned are at varying stages of their development, what I have illustrated through them is that neither the arrangements currently, or those developing in the near future, can match the political rhetoric of devolution in England. Undoubtedly, the post-ERA future of English regionalisation marks a return to an institutional landscape dominated by the three underlying contradictions that we have viewed not only through the RDAs but also regional policy historically. Furthermore, it marks a return to Johnson's (1983: 6 ) stable set of propositions that have characterised the desire for politics of decentralisation: (i) the concentration of power at the centre in the British system of government is harmful and should be reversed;
(ii) the practices of government are insufficiently democratic; and (iii) the rate of economic development has been inadequate and is unequally distributed.
In England, therefore, it might still be your region, but it's still their choice.
In the final part of this paper, I want to return to my earlier argument that there is scope for greater engagement with more grounded thick approaches to political economy which seek to blend empirical and theoretical claimed that it was due to an already compressed political timetable, but Hazell (2000) has forcefully argued that it was because (i) there was a lack of collective political will; and, (ii) the Regional Chambers proposed composition of 'deadbeat' local councillors were strongly opposed by business. iv This opinion comes cross unequivocally in the statement made by John Prescott to the House at the announcement of the Building Partnerships for Prosperity White Paper on 3
December 1997: "As we have made clear in our manifesto, we are committed to moving, with the consent of local people, to directly elected regional government in England" (Hansard, 1997) . v The economic disparity between the three best-and worst-performing regions in England grew by over 30% in Labour's first term (Huggins, 2001) . vi Most of the Regional Chambers have now renamed themselves Regional Assemblies but to avoid confusion with the directly-elected regional assemblies, throughout the remainder of this paper I will continue to call them by their original name to avoid the understandable confusion which would arise. vii At the original announcement the 3 regions were the North East, North West, and Yorkshire & the Humber, but a month later the referendums in the North West and Yorkshire & the Humber were postponed indefinitely.
